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JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
This Appeal is primarily from an Order of the Third District 
Court dated July 3, 1989, granting Respondent's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and dismissing with prejudice Plaintiffs' claims, 
thereby disposing of all issues before the Court. This 
Appeal is also taken from an August 11, 1988, Order of the Third 
District Court dismissing as barred by the statute of limitations 
two claims set forth in Plaintiffs' Complaint. This Court is 
vested with jurisdiction to hear and decide this Appeal pursuant 
to Sections 78-2-2(3)(j) and 78-2-2(4), Utah Code Ann., 1953, as 
amended, and Rule 4A, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the District Court erred in summarily concluding 
as a matter of law that the language contained in the subject 
authorization unambiguously provided blanket authorization for 
Respondent's disbursement of funds without Appellant Butcher's 
specific knowledge or approval. 
2. Whether the language of the authorization is so clear and 
unambiguous as to preclude any parol evidence regarding the 
parties' intent behind said language. 
3. Whether the Uniform Commercial Code and Utah's six-year 
statute of Limitations bar any portions of Appellants' claims 
against Respondent for unauthorized disbursements. 
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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
• . . The [summary] judgment sought shall be rendered! 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law 
§78-12-23, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended): 
Within six-years: 
(2) An action upon any contract, obligation, or 
liability founded upon an instrument in writing, except 
those mentioned in Section 78-12-22. 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
Appellants sued Respondent for damages resulting from 
Respondent's breach of fiduciary and contractual duties under a 
Promissory Note and Deed of Trust. The suit was filed on March 
4, 1987. (R. 1.) Respondent moved for Summary Judgment on the 
ground that the claims were barred by an applicable statute of 
limitations. (R. 19-20.) Based on its application of U.C.A. 
§78-12-23, the District Court granted the Motion as to the two 
claims identified in paragraphs 7(a) and (7)(b) of the Complaint. 
(R. 60-61 and 2-3.) 
Later, Respondent filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
(R. 69-70.) On July 3, 1989, the District Court granted this 
Motion based based on its interpretation of a written 
Authorization executed by Appellant Butcher. (R. 117.) 
Appellants1 first appeal was filed on August 3, 1989 - 31 
days following entry of the final Judgment. (R. 119.) 
Appellants1 Request for Extension of Time for Filing Notice of 
Appeal was granted by the District Court on August 31, 1989. (R. 
135.) Because the District Court's Order permitting the late 
filing of Appellants' Notice of Appeal was entered after 
Appellants' first Notice of Appeal, question was raised by a 
staff attorney at the Utah Supreme Court as to the propriety of 
the appeal. Therefore, a second, separate appeal was commenced. 
This was done to remove any question as to the appellate court's 
jurisdiction to decide the controversy. This Court consolidated 
the two appeals by Order dated December 26, 1989. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In December of 1980, Appellant Lewis W. Butcher ( "Butcher") 
borrowed $86,500c00 from Respondent Crossland Savings, FSB, fka 
Western Savings & Loan Company ("Crossland") pursuant to a 
Promissory Note dated December 9, 1980 and secured by a Deed of 
Trust of the same date. (R. 2.) Co-Appellant Tracy Collins Bank 
& Trust Company is named as the Trustee in the Deed of Trust. (R. 
1). 
The loan was intended to provide funding for the construction 
of improvements on real property located at 3980 South 1900 East 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 1-2.) 
A separate account with Crossland on which Butcher was the 
authorized signatory was established and $74,188.00 of the 
loan proceeds were deposited therein. (R. 2.) 
At the time of the loan, Mr. Butcher executed a document 
("Authorization") which states: 
In connection with our loan, as captioned 
above, we hereby authorize you to make all 
checks, necessary for payoffs, direct to the 
parties concerned. 
(R. 78.) 
Crossland disbursed funds from the account, on the following 
dates: 
(a) February 12, 1981; 
(b) February 19, 1981; 
(c) March 1, 1981; and 
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(d) June 22, 1981. 
(R. 2-3.) Butcher had no knowledge of these disbursements at the 
time each was made. ( R. 2.) 
In July of 1981, Butcher met with Crossland and made demand 
concerning the disbursements. Crossland refused Butcher's 
demands at that time due to a lack of funds in the account. (R. 
35, 47, 50.) 
On March 4, 1987, following several unsuccessful 
communications between the parties, Butcher filed an action 
against Crossland, seeking damages resulting from the 
unauthorized disbursements and an Order restraining Crossland 
from proceeding with a Non-Judicial Trust Deed Foreclosure during 
the pendency of the action. (R. 1-4.) 
On August 11, 1988, the District Court entered Partial 
Summary Judgment dismissing the claims arising out of the 
disbursements occurring on February 12 and February 19, 1981, 
based on its conclusion that those claims were barred by the 
six-year statute of limitations set forth at §78-12-23, Utah Code 
Ann.. (R. 58, 60-61.) 
On April 18, 1989, Crossland filed a second Motion for 
Summary Judgment based on the Authorization executed by Butcher. 
(R. 69-95.) On July 3, 1989, the District Court granted 
Crosslandfs Motion without considering evidence as to the meaning 
of or intent behind the Authorization. (R. 117-18.) 
From both Orders of the District Court, Appellants appeal. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Argument I; The District Court found that the written 
Authorization signed by Butcher allowed the disbursements at 
issue without notice to Butcher. However the ambiguous nature of 
the language of the Authorization requires the use of parol 
evidence to explain the reasons behind the writing. The Court 
failed to make a determination as to the integration of the 
Authorization. The summary judgment should therefore be reversed 
and the case remanded. 
Argument II; The District Court found that the statute of 
limitations set forth in §78-12-23, Utah Code Ann., commenced 
running on the date of each disbursement. However, a depositor's 
cause of action against its bank does not commence until demand 
for payment is made by the depositor and payment is refused by 
the bank. State ex rel. Baker v. Intermountain Farmers, 668 P.2d 
503, 506 (Utah 1983). Under Utah case law and U.C.A. §70A-4-406 
the six-year statute of limitations did not begin to run until 
July 1981. All of Appellants1 claims were timely filed, contrary 
to the District Court's holding. 
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ARGUMENT 
Standard of Review 
This being an appeal from the grant of two motions for 
summary judgment, the applicable standard of review requires that 
this Court accord "no particular deference to the trial court's 
legal conclusions concerning whether the material facts are in 
dispute and, if they are not, what legal result obtains-" 
Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utahf 116 Utah Adv. Rep- 27, 29 
(Utah App. 1989)- This Court must consider the evidence 
presented in a light most favorable to Butcher and must reverse 
the District Court if a genuine dispute as to any material issue 
of fact exists or if Crossland is not entitled to Judgment as a 
matter of law under the facts as advanced by Butcher. Id.; Rule 
56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ARGUMENT I. 
EVIDENCE REGARDING THE INTERPRETATION OF 
THE WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION WAS ERRONEOUSLY 
EXCLUDED BY THE DISTRICT COURT. 
The District Court granted its final Order dismissing 
Butcher's remaining claims on the basis that the written 
Authorization, on it face, permitted Crossland to make the 
disbursements in question without notifying Butcher. However, 
the Court erred in failing to consider parol evidence to 
establish the parties1 intent behind and reason for the 
Authorization. 
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Where a writing is not the primary contract between the 
parties, parol evidence is admissible to explain the reason for 
the writing. Abrams v. Financial Service Company, 374 P.2d 309 
(Utah 1962); Nordin v. Zimmer, 373 P.2d 738 (Alaska 1962). In 
Abrams, the Utah Supreme Court held that parol evidence had been 
properly admitted to establish the reason for a written 
amendatory agreement where the original purchase agreement was a 
valid contract and the connection between the contract and the 
amendatory agreement was not apparent given various information 
contained in both documents. Abrams, supra at 310-11. The 
written Authorization at hand does not purport to be the contract 
between the parties but is an amendatory change to the original 
contract terms. As such, parol evidence is admissible to 
establish the reasons for the amendment, which reasons are not 
facially apparent on the Authorization. Consequently, the 
Summary Judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for the 
admission of parol evidence pursuant to Abramis. 
The Court also erred in its failure to consider parol 
evidence without first making a determination that the writing 
was intended by the parties to be integrated. Union Bank v. 
Swenson, 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985); Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. 
Lentz, 501 P.2d 266 (Utah 1972). Parol evidence is relevant and 
admissible in making such determination. Union Bank v. Swenson, 
supra. The District Court below made no such determination, in 
the record or otherwise. Absent such a determination, the Court 
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erred in making a ruling based solely on the contents of the 
Authorization. The case should be remanded to the District Court 
at least for a determination as to whether the Authorization is 
an integrated document. 
Only after making such a determination should the Court face 
the question of the admissibility of parol evidence. If the 
Authorization is not an integrated document, the parol evidence 
rule does not apply to exclude parol evidence. Even if the 
document is found to be integrated, the parol evidence rule 
allows the admission of additional evidence to clarify facial 
ambiguities on the document. Union Bank v. Swenson, supra at 
665. 
An ambiguity occurs when the writing leaves uncertain or 
incomplete the parties1 rights and duties. Barnes v. Wood, 750 
P.2d 1226 (Utah App. 1988). The Authorization refers to the 
loan between the parties and consists of one sentence authorizing 
Crossland Mto make all checks, necessary for payoffs, direct to 
the parties concerned." This statement does not provide that 
Crossland "may deliver without notice to Butcher whatever 
disbursement the builder requests." ... No reference whatsoever 
is made to the disbursement or surrender of the funds nor to 
Butcher's abrogation of his right to notice of payment. While a 
depositor in Butcher's position might willingly abandon his 
right to see and sign the actual disbursement checks, it is 
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unreasonable to believe he would abandon his right to know and 
approve of the amount and frequency of disbursements relative to 
the progress (or lack of progress) on the construction site. 
If the document were truly unambiguous, the only fair 
interpretation of the actual language used would be that checks 
are to be made payable direct to the parties concerned, with all 
duties relative to notification remaining undisturbed. The 
District Court's ruling to the contrary assumes terms missing 
from the language of the Authorization* The language of the 
Authorization is, at best, ambiguous as to the parties1 duties 
and rights regarding notice of disbursements. The case should 
be remanded under Barnes v. Wood, supra, for the admission of 
parol evidence on that issue. 
ARGUMENT II. 
ALL OF APPELLANTS' CLAIMS AGAINST RESPONDENT WERE 
TIMELY FILED AND THE DISTRICT COURT'S DISMISSAL 
OF TWO IN ITS FIRST PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS 
ERRONEOUS. 
Appellants do not contest the applicability of the statutory 
six-year statute of limitations found at §78-12-23, Utah Code 
Ann.. They contest the District Court's ruling as to the 
commencement of the running of the statutory period. In finding 
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two of Butcher's claims barred by the statute, the District 
Court impliedly determined that the statutory period commenced to 
run on the date of each disbursement. Appellants submit the 
limitations period did not commence until July 1981, rendering 
all claims against Crossland timely. 
Generally, a statute of limitations period commences to run 
the moment a cause of action arises. O'Hair v. Kounalis, 463 
P.2d 799 (Utah 1970). For a breach of contract claim, the 
limitations period generally begins to run upon the occurrence of 
a breach. Upland Industries v. Pacific Gamble Robinson, 684 P.2d 
638 (Utah 1984). However, the Utah Supreme Court has laid down 
an exception to the general rule based on the special 
relationship between a bank and its depositor. The Court has 
long recognized that where a bank holds the depositor's money, 
the statute of limitations on the depositor's cause of action 
against the bank commences upon the depositor's demand for 
payment and the bank's refusal to pay. State ex rel. Baker v. 
Intermountain Farmers, 668 P.2d 503 (Utah 1983); Esponda v. Ogden 
State Bank, 283 P. 729 (Utah 1929). Hence, a suit commenced 
within the statutorily-allowed time after the bank's refusal to 
pay will not be barred. See Esponda v. Ogden State Bank, supra. 
Here, Crossland held Butcher's deposit in an account 
upon which Butcher was the signator. Butcher first made 
demand against Crossland in July 1981 (R. 35, 47, 50), which 
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demand was refused by Crossland at that time. Consequently, the 
statute of limitations on Butcher's claim commenced no earlier 
than July 1981 and ended no earlier than July 1987. The two 
claims contained in Butcher's March 4, 1987 Complaint which the 
District Court disallowed were therefore timely. 
Section 4-406 of the Uniform Commercial Code supports our 
Supreme Court's rule. This section, intimately tied with the 
limitations issue, is applied by the majority of jurisdictions 
addressing similar situations. See, e.g., Tally v. American 
Security Bank, 35 UCC Rep. Serv. 215 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Boutros v. 
Riggs National Banky D.C., 655 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1981); 
Hawkland, Leary and Alderman, UCC Series 502 (1984). 
Where more than one statute relates to the same subject 
matter, the statutes must be construed so as to make them 
harmonious with one another. Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 
618 P.2d 480 (Utah 1980) . 
U.C.A. Section 7QA-4-406 governs the situation in which a 
bank wrongfully disburses a depositor's funds. This section 
provides: 
... a customer who does not within one year 
from the time a statement and items are made 
available to the customer ... discover and 
report his unauthorized signature or any 
alteration on the face or back of the item ... 
is precluded from asserting against the bank 
such unauthorized signature or endorsement 
* . • » 
§70A-4-406(4). 
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In effect, this section sets forth a one-year time period 
within which a depositor must discover and notify the bank of a 
wrongful payment or lose his right to assert a claim for the 
wrongful disbursement against the bank. If the depositor fails 
to notify the bank within the one-year period, he is precluded 
from making further claim against the bank. §70A-4-406(4). In 
recognition of the special relationship between a bank and its 
depositor and of the need for communication between the two, the 
Code provides that the one-year period does not commence until 
the bank provides the depositor with a statement of the account 
accompanied by "items paid in good faith in support of the debit 
entries", thereby providing the depositor with the opportunity to 
discover the accrual of his claim against the bank. Id. at 
subsection (1). 
The relationship between §70A-4-406 and §78-12-23 is 
important. Generally, the purpose of §70A-4-406 is to provide 
one uniform rule throughout the country in place of the 
myriad of time periods that existed prior to the Code. See UCC 
S70A-4-406, official comments 5 and 7; Brighton Inc. v. Colonial 
First National Bank, 422 A.2d 433 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1980), aff'd 
430 A.2d 902 (1981). 
The one-year demand period contained in §70A-4-406 is a 
substantive law which precedes the commencement of running of the 
six-year statute of limitations, defines the scope of a 
depositor's remedy, and destroys any claim against the 
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bank not timely made. This destruction occurs regardless of the 
theory on which the Plaintiff brings suit, Brighton, Inc. v« 
Colonial First National Bank, supra, and regardless of the care 
exercised by either party. Sun 'N Sand, Inc. v. United 
California Bank, 129 Cal. Rptr. 861 (2d Dist. 1976), superseded 
582 P.2d 920 (1978). 
If §70A-4-406 can cut off a claim otherwise timely under 
Utah's six-year statue of limitations for claims based on written 
instruments, consistency demands that the section also provide 
the mechanism for commencing the period during which a claim may 
be brought. 
Here, the two disbursements summarily dismissed by the 
District Court's August 11, 1988 Partial Summary Judgment 
occurred on February 12 and February 19, 1981. Assuming that 
Crossland remitted monthly statements of account to its 
depositors, Butcher would have received a statement covering 
these disbursements no earlier than March 1981. Under 
§70-A-4-406, the one-year notice period for preservation of 
Butcher's claim would begin to run from the date Crossland made 
its statement available to Butcher in March L981. In June 1981, 
demand for the disbursed funds was made on Butcher's behalf, 
which demand was refused due to lack of funds in the account. (R. 
Crossland's failure to respond to Butcher's Request for 
Production of Documents prevents Butcher from submitting a more 
exact date of Crossland's statement. 
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47.) The following month, Butcher personally visited Crossland 
to discuss the disbursements. (R. 35, 50.) Butcher's July visit 
provided not only the timely notification required under UCC 
§70A-4-406 for each of the disbursements in question, but also 
set in motion the six-year statute of limitations period set 
forth in §78-12-23 as interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court in 
State v. Intermountain Farmers, supra, and Esponda, supra. 
Consequently, Butcher's March 4, 1987, filing of his claims 
against Crossland based on the February 1981 disbursements would 
be timely and should not have been dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
The written Authorization on which the District Court based 
its summary judgment is ambiguous as to the parties1 rights and 
duties concerning prior notification of proposed disbursements. 
Viewed in a light most favorable to Appellants, the document may 
reasonably be interpreted to release Crossland from its duty to 
name Butcher as a co-payee on its disbursement checks. The 
document does not release Crossland from its duty to notify 
Butcher of the fact or amount of any disbursement from the 
account. A genuine material dispute of fact exists as to 
Crossland1s right to disburse Butcher's loan proceeds without 
prior notice to him. 
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The District Court's failure to render a ruling on the 
integration of the Authorization requires remand pursuant to 
Abrams. 
In an action involving a claim by a depositor against his 
bank, the six-year statute of limitations period does not 
commence until the depositor demands payment of his funds and the 
bank refuses. Here, notice was given and demand for payment 
made and refused within four months after the bank should have 
sent the relevant statement, and suit was filed within six-years 
of the date of demand. Appellant's claims were timely filed as 
a matter of law. The District Court's August 11, 1988 Summary 
Judgment should be reversed and remanded for further proceedings 
on the two claims earlier dismissed. 
DATED this //^^aay of January, 1990. 
DOUGLAS G. MORTfiNSEN 
KRIS C. R. LEONARD 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Appellants 
7 CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On the /if day of January, 1990, I mailed four true and 
accurate copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS, postage 
prepaid, to: 
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FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
AUG II 1988 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TRACY COLLINS BANK & TRUST 
COMPANY, Trustee, and 
LEWIS W. BUTCHER, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CROSSLAND SAVINGS, FSB, 
formerly known as WESTERN 
SAVINGS AND LOAN COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. C87-1606 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
, YEATES 
IZAHLER 
11, Suits 900 
ourth South 
The hearing on defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
came before this Court on the 9th day of August, 1988 at 
9:00 a.m., Rodney M. Pipella, attorney, appeared on behalf of 
plaintiffs Tracy Collins Bank & Trust Company, Trustee, and 
Lewis W. Butcher, and Thomas M. Melton, attorney, appeared on 
behalf of defendant CrossLand Savings, FSB, formerly known as 
Western Savings and Loan Company. Based on said Motion, and 
good cause appearing, therefore: 
RINCE, YEATES 
I QELDZAHLER 
f Centre I, Suite 900 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs1 claims 
identified in its Complaint, paragraph 7(a), in the sum of 
$18,800, and 7(b), in the sum of $5,000 are barred by the 
statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 
and defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on these claims is 
hereby granted. 
DATED thi day of August, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
_^&L*-<> 
1319F 
283-231.2 
081088 
udge Raymond S. Uno 
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Third JudiSSSi District 
JUL 3 1389 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
J. Randall Call (0541) 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TRACY COLLINS BANK & TRUST 
COMPANY, Trustee, and 
LEWIS W.BUTCHER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CROSSLAND SAVINGS, FSB, fka 
WESTERN SAVINGS & LOAN 
COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
O R D E R 
Civil No. C87-1606 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
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• I, Suits 900 J 
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aka City 
The hearing for defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment came before this Court on the 22nd day of June, 1989, 
at 9:30 a.m. Thomas M. Melton and Don R. Schow, attorneys, 
appeared on behalf of defendant CrossLand Savings, FSB, 
formerly known as Western Savings and Loan Company, and Rodney 
M. Pipella, attorney, appeared on behalf of plaintiffs Lewis W. 
Butcher and Tracy Collins Bank & Trust Company, Trustee. Based 
on said Motion, and good cause appearing, therefore: 
PRINCE, YEATES 
ft QELOZAHLER 
y Centre I, Suit* 900 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' claims be 
dismissed with prejudice, as there was written authorization by 
the plaintiff Lewis W. Butcher for the defendant's 
disbursements. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
these claims is hereby granted. 
DATED this,f/*^2_ daY Q f Q ^ y ; 1989-
BY THE COURT: 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
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